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Abstract
Background:  Studies conducted in developed countries using economic models show that
individual- and household- level variables are important determinants of health insurance
ownership. There is however a dearth of such studies in sub-Saharan Africa. The objective of this
study was to examine the relationship between health insurance ownership and the demographic,
economic and educational characteristics of South African women.
Methods: The analysis was based on data from a cross-sectional national household sample
derived from the South African Health Inequalities Survey (SANHIS). The study subjects consisted
of 3,489 women, aged between 16 and 64 years. It was a non-interventional, qualitative response
econometric study. The outcome measure was the probability of a respondent's ownership of a
health insurance policy.
Results: The χ2 test for goodness of fit indicated satisfactory prediction of the estimated logit
model. The coefficients of the covariates for area of residence, income, education, environment
rating, age, smoking and marital status were positive, and all statistically significant at p ≤ 0.05.
Women who had standard 10 education and above (secondary), high incomes and lived in affluent
provinces and permanent accommodations, had a higher likelihood of being insured.
Conclusion:  Poverty reduction programmes aimed at increasing women's incomes in poor
provinces; improving living environment (e.g. potable water supplies, sanitation, electricity and
housing) for women in urban informal settlements; enhancing women's access to education;
reducing unemployment among women; and increasing effective coverage of family planning
services, will empower South African women to reach a higher standard of living and in doing so
increase their economic access to health insurance policies and the associated health services.
Background
A health system in any country performs instrumental
functions of stewardship (oversight), creation of resources
(investment and training), delivering services (provision),
and financing (collecting, pooling and purchasing) [1].
Ultimately, the effectiveness and efficiency with which
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these functions are executed determine the extent to
which a health system achieves its intrinsic goals of
improving health, responding to people's non-medical
expectations, and fairness of financial contributions. For
instance, the extent to which South Africa's post-apartheid
government will be able to attain its vision of creating a
caring and humane society in which all citizens have
access to affordable good quality health care will depend
on the performance of its national health system [2].
Prior to the 1994 democratic elections in South Africa, the
health system was built on the apartheid ideology, which
was characterized by racially segregated health services,
geographical disparities, fragmentation, duplication and
specialized hospital-centred services favouring the urban
populations [3]. The health system's functions were inef-
ficiently and inequitably performed. The health system
was not effective in: improving the health status of the
majority of the formerly disenfranchised South Africans;
responding to their legitimate non-medical expectations;
and ensuring their social protection from the impoverish-
ing catastrophic health expenditures [4]. Consequently,
provision of primary health services was for a long time
neglected and inequitable [34]. The worsening poverty sit-
uation in some provinces has made the primary health
services inaccessible to the majority of the population
[35].
In an attempt to overcome the above-mentioned public
health challenges, the post-apartheid democratic govern-
ments have introduced several reforms in the health sec-
tor: creation of a quasi-federal structure with one national
and nine provincial departments of health (provincial leg-
islatures and bureaucracies); establishment of a district
health system, including expansion and upgrading of the
primary care infrastructure; and health care financing [5].
The latter included: use of a population and need-based
resource allocation mechanism by the National Depart-
ment of Health up to 1995 (after which each province
receives a block grant directly from the national treasury);
the removal of public sector fees for pregnant and lactat-
ing women, children under six years of age and all those
who use the public primary health care system; and the
enactment of a Medical Insurance Schemes Act aimed at
regulating the medical insurance schemes industry more
effectively.
In spite of the abovementioned policy interventions, pri-
mary health care still remains under funded. For example,
in 2003/2004 financial year, South Africa spent a total of
36.9 billion Rands (1 Rand = US$6) on health: 61.3% was
spent on hospitals curative care, 16.1% on primary health
care, 1.8% on HIV/AIDS treatment, 2.3% on nutrition,
4.0% on emergency services, 4.3% on administration,
2.5% on training, 1.6% on support services and 6.1% on
other services [34].
According to Doherty and McLeod [6] and McIntyre et al.
[7], the primary objectives of the Medical Insurance
Schemes Act of 1998 are to: (i) increase the number of
people covered; (ii) improve health-related cross subsidi-
zation within individual medical insurance schemes and
curtail exclusion of high-risk groups, e.g. the elderly; (iii)
prevent 'dumping' of medical insurance scheme members
on public hospitals by requiring the schemes to cover a
prescribed minimum package of hospital services for all
members; and (iv) ensure effective health care cost
containment.
In 2001, there were 146 registered medical schemes (i.e.
those falling fully under the Act) and eight Bargaining
Council schemes (i.e. those granted exemption from cer-
tain provisions of the Act), all covering a total of 7 million
people [6], i.e. less than 20% of the South African popu-
lation. An additional 2 million people were covered by
private insurance or industry-specific health services [7].
Unfortunately, there has been no significant increase in
the size of the population covered by the medical schemes
since the implementation of the Act. For instance, in 2003
South Africa had uninsured population of 38.6 million
people: 15.1% were from Eastern Cape province, 6.0%
from Free State, 17.8% from Gauteng, 22.1% from Kwa-
zulu Natal, 12.8% from Limpopo, 7.2% from Mpuma-
langa, 1.7% from Northern Cape, 8.5% from North West
and 8.7% from Western Cape [34].
The objective of this study was to examine the relation-
ship between individuals' demographic, economic and
educational characteristics, and their likelihood of being
insured.
Methods
Conceptual framework
There are two kinds of risks involved in health care: (i) the
risk of becoming ill, with the accompanying loss in the
quality of life, cost of medical care, loss of productive time
during illness and, in more serious cases, death; and (ii)
the risk of total or incomplete or delayed recovery [8].
Welfare economics of uncertainty predicts that individu-
als would like to insure against both forms of risks. The
theory of expected utility, on which this study is based,
assumes that each individual strives to maximize the
expected value of a utility function; individuals are nor-
mally risk-averse, meaning that they have a diminishing
marginal utility of income; and health risks for different
individuals are basically independent, so that pooling
them reduces the risk to the insurer to relatively small pro-
portions [9].BMC Health Services Research 2005, 5:17 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/5/17
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In the South African National Health Inequalities Survey
(SANHIS) [10], the respondents were asked the following
question: "Does anyone in this household belong to a
medical aid or health insurance scheme? 1 = Yes, 2 = No".
Given the dichotomous nature of this question, we shall
assume that the potential health insurance consumer
faces the choice between purchase of some or no insur-
ance. The consumer chooses between the two prospects
on the basis of the utility expected from each.
The potential consumers of insurance are assumed to
make decisions based on the magnitude of the perceived
difference between the level of expected utility with insur-
ance (EU1) and expected utility without insurance (EU2).
We need to analyse the effect of changes in the independ-
ent variables on the difference in the level of the expected
utility of the two prospects, i.e. EU1 minus EU2. If the dif-
ference were equal to zero, the consumer would be
expected to be indifferent between the two prospects.
However, if the difference were greater than 0, then the
risk-averse consumer would be expected to opt for insur-
ance [11].
The empirical model used in the analysis of individual
household's choice between having no health insurance
and having health insurance is presented in the Appendix.
The variables included in the model are defined in Table
1.
Since economic theory does not provide much guidance
on model specification, the choice of explanatory varia-
bles in the current study were guided by the past health
insurance demand studies undertaken in the U.S.A. [12-
15], Europe [16-18] and Israel [19,20].
Once again, based on past health insurance choice analy-
sis studies, the coefficients of the variables included in
equation 2 in the Appendix would, a priori be expected to
assume the signs indicated in Table 2.
A Chi-Squared test (χ2) for independence was undertaken
to test the relationship between health insurance owner-
ship and the individual independent variables. The null
hypothesis is that the two variables are independent of
one another (because there is a significantly large differ-
ence between the observed data and the calculated
expected data). The alternate hypothesis is that the two
variables are dependent on each other (because there is
not a significant difference). Thus, for health rating, the
hypotheses are as follows: (i) H0: A person's health insur-
ance ownership status and their health rating are inde-
pendent or unrelated; and (ii) HA: A person's health
insurance ownership status and their health rating are
related (dependent on each other).
Data
The data for empirical analysis were taken from the 1994
South African National Health Inequalities Survey, a
household survey of a randomly selected sample of the
South African population between the ages of 16 and 64
years [10]. The full sample was 3,796 persons, out of
which 3,489 were women. Our analysis focused on the
latter. The data set was rich with economic, demographic,
social and health characteristics of the respondents.
Table 1: Definition of variables
Variable Variable description
Health insurance ownership 1 = if the respondent has health insurance; 0 otherwise
Health rating 1 = if self-evaluated health status is excellent, very good or good; 0 otherwise
Environment rating 1 = if the respondent feels that the environment she lives in is good, very good or excellent; 0 otherwise
Residence 1 = if the respondent resides in either metro formal area, metro transitional area, smaller city/town formal area, 
smaller city/town transitional area, or rural white farms; 0 = metro informal area, smaller city/town informal area, or 
rural – "homeland"
Income Total monthly gross income in Rand (US$≈6 Rand)
Education Respondent's education level: 1 = matriculation (standard 10 or secondary school) and above; 0 = below 
matriculation
Age Respondent's age in years
Age squared Respondent's age squared
Race 1 = if respondent is white; 0 if person of colour
Household size Total number of persons in a household
Occupation 1 = if a white-collar worker; 0 otherwise
Employment status 1 = if unemployed and looking; 0 = otherwise
Smoking 1 = if the respondent smokes cigarettes; 0 otherwise
Alcohol use 1 = if the respondent drinks alcohol; 0 otherwise
Contraceptive use 1 = if respondent uses a contraceptive; 0 = otherwise
Marital status 1 = if married; 0 = single, separated or divorcedBMC Health Services Research 2005, 5:17 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/5/17
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Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 3 presents the frequency and percentage distribu-
tion of the dependent and independent variables. Overall,
30% of the women in the sample said that they had a
household member with a health insurance policy.
Ninety five percent of the respondents who reported to
have got a household member belonging to a medical aid
or health insurance scheme lived in formal city dwellings
and/or on farms owned by white South Africans.
In the overall sample, the median income was 849.5 Rand
and the mean was 1546.4 Rand, with a standard deviation
(STD) of 1998.2 Rand. The sub-sample of the households
without health insurance had an average income of 853
Rand (STD = 1073) compared to 3172 Rand (STD = 2623)
in the group with insurance. Seventy-seven percent of the
households with at least one member with health insur-
ance had a monthly income of more than 951 South Afri-
can Rand, compared to only 28% among the group
without health insurance.
The average and median household size in the overall
sample was five members, with a standard deviation of
about 3. The group with health insurance had an average
household size of four people (STD = 2.1) compared to 5
people (STD = 2.7) in the group without insurance. Fifty-
seven percent of the sub-sample without health insurance
had a household size of more than five members com-
pared to 38% among the group with health insurance.
The group with health insurance had an average age of 40
years (STD = 12.5) compared to 41 years (STD = 14.1) in
the group without insurance. The average age in the whole
sample was 40.9 years (STD = 13.6) and the median was
39 years.
As alluded to in the methods section, a Chi-Squared test
for independence was undertaken to test the relationship
between health insurance ownership and the individual
independent variables. The results are presented in the last
column of Table 3. Since the computed Chi-Squared
values for health rating, environment rating, residence,
income, education, age, race, household size, occupation,
employment status, alcohol use, contraceptive use and
marital status were greater than their respective critical
Chi-Squared values (at 5% significance level) we reject the
null hypotheses and conclude that the row and column
variables in Table 3 are not independent. Thus, for exam-
ple in the case of health rating, we would accept the alter-
native hypothesis (HA) that a person's health insurance
ownership status and their health rating are related
(dependent on each other).
Regression analysis
Table 4 provides odds ratios, 'p' values, coefficients, and 't'
test values. The t-test is used to test the hypothesis (i.e. H0:
β = 0) about individual regression slope coefficients. The
't' values for individual variables are obtained by dividing
their coefficients (e.g. βINCOME) by their standard errors
(e.g. SEINCOME). For example, the coefficient for income is
0.0004727 and the standard error is 0.0000339, and given
H0: β = 0, the relevant t-value is indeed 13.946 as specified
in Table 4:
Table 2: Hypothesized relationships between the dependent variable (insurance ownership) and independent variables
Independent 
Variables
Variable 
coefficient
Expected sign Studies from which the hypothesized signs are based
Health rating B1 Negative Trujillo [23], Coasta and Garcia [28]
Environment rating B2 Indeterminate
Residence β3 Positive Liu and Chen [31]
Income β4 Positive Deb et al [22], Trujillo [23], Vera-Hernandez [26], Coasta and Garcia [28], Besley et al [32]
Education β5 Positive Deb et al [22], Trujillo [23], Vera-Hernandez [26], Coasta and Garcia [28], Besley et al [32], 
Liu and Chen [31]
Age β6 Positive Trujillo [23], Liu and Chen [31], Grossman [12]
Age squared β7 Negative Trujillo [23], Grossman [12]
Race β8 Indeterminate
Household size β9 Negative Deb et al [22], Vera-Hernandez [26], Besley et al [32]
Occupation β10 Positive Vera-Hernandez [26]
Employment status β11 Negative Vera-Hernandez [26], Liu and Chen [31]
Smoking β12 Indeterminate
Alcohol use β13 Indeterminate
Contraceptive use β14 Indeterminate
Marital status β15 Positive Rhine et al [21], Trujillo [23], Liu and Chen [31]BMC Health Services Research 2005, 5:17 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/5/17
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tINCOME  = (βINCOME)/(SEINCOME) = (0.0004727)/
(0.0000339) = 13.946
The decision rule is: reject the null hypothesis (H0: β = 0)
if the calculated t-value, tk, is greater than the critical t-
value, tc, as long as the sign of tk is the same as the sign of
the coefficient implied in the alternative hypothesis (HA:
β≠0). Otherwise, accept the null hypothesis (H0) that the
estimated regression coefficient in question is not signifi-
cantly different from zero. In the above example, the coef-
ficient of income is statistically significant at 95% level of
confidence, based on a two-sided test, since the computed
t-value (13.946) is greater than the critical t-value (1.960).
The coefficient (β) of the estimated binary logit model
measures the impact of a one-unit change in an explana-
tory variable (Ri) on the log of odds of a health insurance
policy ownership, holding other explanatory variables
constant. The coefficients for environment rating, resi-
dence, income, education, age, smoking and marital sta-
tus are statistically significant at 95% level of confidence,
and have positive signs. The latter result implies that an
Table 3: Frequencies and percentages for explanatory variables
Variables With insurance: frequency 
(%)[N = 1044)
Without insurance: frequency 
(%) [N = 2445]
Chi-square (p-value)
Health rating: 1 = Excellent/very good/good 435 (41.67) 1238 (50.63) 23.57 (p < 0.0001)
0 = Fair and poor 609 (58.33) 1207 (49.37)
Environment rating: 1 = Good/very good/
Excellent living environment
491 (47.03) 1580 (64.62) 93.843959 (P < 0.0001)
0 = Fair or poor 553 (52.97) 865 (35.38)
Residence: 1 = Formal city dwellings + white 
farms
995 (95.31) 1625 (66.46) 325.45 (P < 0.0001)
0 = Informal dwellings +"former homelands" 49 (4.69) 820 (33.54)
Income (in Rand): No regular income 137 (13.12) 275 (11.25) 1238.93 (P < 0.0001)
1 – 950 100 (9.58) 1497 (61.23)
951 – 1900 179 (17.15) 435 (17.79)
1901 – 3800 317 (30.36) 191 (7.81)
3801 – 7600 223 (21.36) 38 (1.55)
7600 + 88 (8.43) 9 (0.37)
Education: 1 = Matriculation (standard 10) 
and above
566 (54.21) 2205 (90.18) 579.15 (P < 0.0001)
0 = Below matriculation 478 (45.79) 240 (9.82)
Age (in years): 16 – 25 128 (12.26) 328 (13.42) 16.53 (P = 0.0024)
26 – 35 299 (28.64) 666 (27.24)
36 – 45 284 (27.20) 586 (23.97)
46 – 55 189 (18.10) 404 (16.52)
56 and above 143 (13.70) 461 (18.85)
Race: 1 = African, Coloured & Indian 947 (90.71) 1981 (81.02) 50.87 (P < 0.0001)
0 = White 97 (9.29) 464 (18.98)
Household size: 1 – 4 household members 647 (61.97) 1043 (42.66) 123.30 (P < 0.0001)
5 – 8 351 (33.62) 1114 (45.56)
9 – 12 41 (3.93) 240 (9.82)
13 and above 5 (0.48) 48 (1.96)
Occupation: 0 = White-collar worker 326 (31.23) 168 (6.87) 357.05 (P < 0.0001)
1 = Blue-collar worker 718 (68.77) 2277 (93.13)
Employment status: 1 = Involuntarily 
unemployed
967 (92.62) 1933 (79.06) 95.94 (P < 0.0001)
0 = Voluntarily unemployed or employed 77 (7.38) 512 (20.94)
Smoking: 1 = If a cigarette smoker 292 (27.97) 607 (24.83) 3.78 (P = 0.0519)
0 = Not a cigarette smoker 752 (72.03) 1838 (75.17)
Alcohol use: 1 = Alcohol drinker 148 (14.18) 276 (11.29) 5.71 (P = 0.0168)
0 = Not alcohol drinker 896 (85.82) 2169 (88.71)
Contraceptive use: 0 = Uses contraceptives 213 (20.40) 399 (16.32) 8.43 (P = 0.0037)
1 = Does not use contraceptives 831 (79.60) 2046 (83.68)
Marital status: 1 = Married 627 (60.06) 1144 (46.79) 51.53 (P < 0.0001)
0 = Single, separated, divorced 417 (39.94) 1301 (53.21)BMC Health Services Research 2005, 5:17 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/5/17
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increase in any of these variables spontaneously impacts
positively on the log of odds of health insurance policy
ownership, holding other factors constant. Contrastingly,
the coefficients for household size, alcohol, contraceptive
use, age-squared, occupation, employment and health rat-
ing are statistically significant, and have got a negative
effect on the log of odds of health insurance policy
ownership.
Discussion
Health rating
Social scientists define health as a product of life expect-
ancy (measured in years) and health-related quality of life
(i.e. mobility, activities of daily living, social participa-
tion, pain, anxiety/depression, energy) [22,23]. The SAN-
HIS data set [10] contained only self-evaluated categorical
health status data. The respondents rated their current
health status as either excellent, very good, good, fair or
poor. The variable was re-coded into a dichotomous vari-
able: 1 = excellent, very good, or good; and 0 if fair or
poor.
An individual's stock of health determines the total
amount of time he/she can spend producing commodities
and money earnings [24]. Health status is an important
determinant of both earnings and capacity for enjoying
life. A decline in the death rate at working ages may
improve earning prospects by extending the period during
which earnings are received [25]. The coefficient for the
health status variable took a negative sign, implying that
the demand for health insurance was likely to be low
among individuals who were in excellent, very good or
good health. In the current study, 58.3% of the respond-
ents in the sub-sample with a health insurance policy
assessed their health status as either fair or poor. This may
be a case of adverse selection [26], which results in insur-
ance having the greatest appeal to individuals who are
more likely to fall sick [9,27]. Adverse selection, depend-
ing on its extent, could jeopardize the economic viability
of a health insurance scheme.
The adverse selection problem can be curbed in two main
ways without compromising equity objectives, namely:
(i) compulsory social health insurance (or a national
health service) for a defined population through legisla-
tion – not an option for private health insurance which is
voluntary by definition; and (ii) the government could
step in and provide health insurance to all those at excep-
tionally high risk (e.g. the elderly and those with chronic
diseases) and the poor who cannot afford the premiums.
Commercial health insurance firms often curb adverse
selection by introducing experience rating, i.e. linking
insurance premium to the degree of assessed risk of falling
sick (this action may have negative equity implications);
and/or subjecting all those who apply for insurance cover
to a thorough medical examination (this could poten-
Table 4: Logistic model regression results
Explanatory variables Odds ratios [95% confidence interval] Coefficients 't'
Health rating 0 0.000009-0.0005 -9.676 -9.537*
Environment rating 26.76 12.43–57.60 3.287 8.404*
Residence 6.969 4.93–9.84 1.942 11.020*
Income 1.001 1.00-1.00 0.0005 13.946*
Education 2.315 1.80–2.97 0.84 6.600*
Age 1.148 1.09–1.20 0.138 5.751*
Age squared 0.999 0.99–1.00 -0.0008 -3.401*
Race 0.787 0.59–1.04 -0.239 -1.691
Household size 0.891 0.86–0.93 -0.115 -5.519*
Occupation 0.733 0.54–0.99 -0.311 -1.971
Employment status 0.518 0.38–0.69 -0.657 -4.308*
Smoking 1.633 1.29–2.07 0.49 4.052*
Alcohol use 0.617 0.45–0.84 -0.483 -3.033*
Contraceptives use 0.372 0.26–0.52 -0.988 -5.700*
Marital status 1.841 1.49–2.27 0.611 5.765*
Constant - - -4.385 -8.755
Sample size 3489
χ2(15) 1438.62
Prob > χ2 0
Pseudo-R2 0.3379
Log likelihood -1409.7041
Note: * Indicates the coefficients are statistically significant at 95% confidence level, based on a two-tailed test. On the basis of chi-square test of the 
log-likelihood ratio, the joint effects of estimated logistic model are statistically significant at the 0.1% level.BMC Health Services Research 2005, 5:17 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/5/17
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tially lead to cream-skimming, excluding all those with
high risks of falling sick).
Economic factors
There were three economic variables, namely, income (+),
occupation (-) and employment (-), where (.) is the
hypothesized sign of the coefficients. The coefficients of
the three variables were statistically significant and had
the expected signs. High incomes, white-collar occupa-
tions and being gainfully employed are significant predic-
tors of health insurance ownership. The proportion of
people with health insurance rises considerably as one
moves up the household income distribution ladder, with
the coverage going from 6.3% of those in the income
range 1–950 Rand to over 90.7% among those earning
7600 Rand and above per month. The trend is similar to
that reported by Harmon and Nolan [16] in Ireland and
Propper [17] in England and Wales. This implies that any
macroeconomic interventions aimed at decreasing invol-
untary unemployment and boosting disposable incomes
among households will spontaneously increase the prob-
ability of health insurance ownership. Thus, the post-
apartheid South African government's economic pro-
grammes of black empowerment, small-scale micro
financing programmes and land (and other assets) redis-
tribution programmes are likely to increase the number of
households with the ability to purchase health insurance
policies.
Demographic factors
The demographic factors include: age (+), age squared (-)
and household size (-), where (.) is the postulated sign of
the coefficient. The coefficients for age and age squared
were statistically significant at the 5% level. Economic the-
ory predicts that as individuals advance in age, their inher-
ited health stock depreciates at an increasing rate (a
manifestation of the biological process of ageing) and
they tend to increase investments in health (including
health insurance) in an attempt to decrease the rate of
depreciation. This is consistent with Grossman's findings
[24] that because the health stock depreciation rate rises
with age, it is not unlikely that unhealthy (old) people
will make larger gross investments in health than healthy
(young) people.
The coefficient for household size variable had a statisti-
cally significant negative effect on the likelihood of health
insurance policy ownership. This finding is intuitively
sensible since any increase in the household size, while
holding the income constant, reduces the per capita
income.
Social factors
The social factors include: education (+) and marital sta-
tus (+). The coefficient for education was statistically
significant, and had the expected positive sign. Respond-
ents with at least a matriculation (secondary) level of edu-
cation were two times more likely to be in possession of a
health insurance policy than those with a lower level of
education. This could be attributed to a positive relation-
ship between a person's: (i) educational level and propen-
sity to acquire skills; (ii) stock of knowledge and his/her
market and non-market productivity [24] and earnings;
and (iii) education and knowledge about the advantage of
making regular small insurance payments to avoid the risk
of catastrophic medical expenditures [28].
Marital status had a statistically significant positive effect
on health insurance ownership. Married persons are more
likely to have insurance cover than those who are single,
separated or divorced. This finding is consistent with the
result obtained by Harmon and Nolan [16], Rhine et al.
[12], Trujillo [14] and Liu and Chen [28]. Married couples
may have a higher demand for health insurance due to: (i)
the need to protect their children [16]; (ii) higher com-
bined income; and (iii) being more averse to the risk of
catastrophic health expenditures than those who are sin-
gle, separated or divorced.
Spatial and environmental factors
The spatial and environmental factors – residence (+) and
environment rating (+) – had a statistically significant
effect on health insurance ownership. The respondents
living in formal urban settlements or rural white-owned
farms had a seven times higher odds of owning a health
insurance policy than those living in informal urban set-
tlements or former rural homelands. This could partly be
a reflection of the economic well being of the former
group.
The respondents who felt that the environment they lived
in was good, very good or excellent were twenty-seven
times more likely to have a health insurance cover than
those who lived in fair or poor environments. This phe-
nomenon may be a reflection of a better socio-economic
status of those living in relatively affluent, formal (and
cleaner) residential areas vis-à-vis  informal settlements
(which are relatively deprived of all kinds of social
amenities).
Behavioural factors
The behavioural factors included in the analysis were:
contraceptive use (-), alcohol use (-) and smoking (+). The
three had a statistically significant effect on the demand
for health insurance. The coefficient for contraceptives
assumed a negative sign. This implies that the use of con-
traceptives may not necessarily be linked with individuals'
attitudes toward risk.BMC Health Services Research 2005, 5:17 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/5/17
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The coefficient for alcohol use also took a negative sign,
which implies that those people who drank alcohol were
less likely to purchase health insurance. On the contrary,
the parameter for smoking assumed a positive sign, mean-
ing that being a cigarette smoker, the probability of a per-
son demanding health insurance coverage increases. In
the context of the health insurance market, the latter find-
ing could be a source of concern if it were a signal for the
presence of moral hazard. Moral hazard is a potential cost
of insurance in which the presence of insurance increases
the tendency for losses to occur through careless, irrespon-
sible or perhaps illegal behaviour [26].
For example, the fully insured individuals may embark on
risky behaviours, such as smoking, and by so doing
expose themselves to a high risk of developing various
forms of cancer (throat cancer, lung cancer, etc.). Insurers
attempt to control moral hazard by careful underwriting
of applicants for insurance and by various policy provi-
sions, such as deductibles (which requires an individual
to pay for a certain amount of health care received before
the insurance comes into effect) and co-insurance/co-pay-
ment (which requires the insured person to pay a certain
percentage of eligible medical expenses in excess of the
deductibles, with the insurer paying the remainder)
[15,29].
This study used consumption of contraceptives, alcoholic
drinks and cigarettes as proxies for consumers' attitudes
toward health risks. The three may not be ideal proxies for
risk attitudes; however, there were no better alternatives in
the data set. If this were a study primarily designed to ana-
lyse the demand for health insurance, it would have been
preferable to either proxy risk attitudes using a qualitative
scale variable ranging from 1 (extremely risk-averse) to 10
(risk-lover) [11], directly estimate the revealed risk-aver-
sion using experimental data [29], or ask the respondent
to report whether he/she would consider paying for pri-
vate health insurance at the point of demand [30].
Limitation of the study
The main weakness of the current study is that since the
data set upon which the analysis was based was gathered
for a different purpose (i.e. it was not dedicated to health
insurance), it did not contain insurance-specific
attributes, e.g. premiums, co-payments, deductibles, ben-
efits covered and the quality of care in the health facilities
where the insured sought care. Thus, we had a situation
where important explanatory variables were left out of the
estimated regression equation 2 (in the Appendix), leading
to specification bias or omitted variable bias [21]. The
omission of a relevant independent variable can change
the estimated coefficient away from the true value of the
population coefficient.
Further research
In sub-Saharan Africa, there is need for studies on the
following:
• The determinants of private and social health insurance
policy ownership, which include both health insurance
programme attributes (e.g. premiums, co-payments,
deductibles) and household socio-economic characteris-
tics (including attitudes toward risk).
• The willingness and ability to pay for various forms of
health insurance, including voluntary and non-voluntary
insurance schemes [31].
• The economic viability of various forms of health insur-
ance, e.g. social health insurance and community-based
prepaid schemes.
• Design of innovative health insurance schemes; for
example, within farmers' cooperative societies [36], sav-
ings and credit societies, agricultural estates, women/men
developmental groups [37], civil service, etc.
• Whether the expansion of private health insurance
under the current health care delivery system would yield
significant public sector cost savings, and improved target-
ing of subsidies for the poor and preventive services [32].
• Optimal ways of curbing health insurance problems of
moral hazard and adverse selection.
• Benefit-incidence analysis of alternative health insur-
ance arrangements.
Conclusion
The environment rating, residence, income, education,
age, smoking and marital status variables were all found
to have a statistically significant (at 95% confidence level)
positive relationship with ownership of health insurance
schemes. Contrastingly, the other covariates, namely:
health rating, age squared, household size, occupation,
employment, alcohol use and contraceptive use had a sig-
nificantly negative relationship with health insurance
ownership.
There are a number of policy implications of this study:
• High incomes, white-collar occupations and being gain-
fully employed are significant predictors of health insur-
ance ownership. Thus, economic development (or
poverty reduction) programmes geared at: (i) improving
incomes of the vulnerable segments of the South African
population; (ii) reducing involuntary unemployment;
and (iii) creating white-collar job opportunities will
empower South African women to reach a higher standardBMC Health Services Research 2005, 5:17 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/5/17
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of living and in doing so boost their economic access to
health insurance policies and the relevant health services.
• Policies aimed at ensuring that the majority of South
Africans attain a matriculation (i.e. secondary) education
level will increase by almost two-fold, the probability of
acquiring health insurance.
• The self-assessed health status was found to have a sta-
tistically negative effect on the demand for health insur-
ance. This implies existence of adverse selection.
However, this problem can be reduced through compul-
sory social health insurance [33]; or through state insur-
ance for high-risk groups, particularly the poor. Since 53%
of the South African population lives below the income
poverty line of US$2 per day [34], implementation of the
social health insurance programme [7] would increase
access to basic health services by poor.
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Appendix: Empirical model
A binary logit model was used in the analysis of individual
household's choice between having no health insurance
and having health insurance. We assumed that the
expected utility associated with each health insurance
option is a function of a vector of its attributes (Xi) and a
vector of a household's socioeconomic characteristics
(Ri), plus a stochastic error term (ε). The latter component
captures errors in model specification (e.g. omission of
relevant variables) and errors in data measurement.
Algebraically, a household's decision process can be
expressed as:
EUij = g(Xij, Ri) + ε .................................... (1);
where: EUij is the utility that ith household expects to
derive from choosing jth health insurance option; j = 1 if a
household has health insurance; j = 2 if a household has
no health insurance; and X, R and ∈ are as defined above.
The basic assumption is that the ith household opts for
'health insurance' if EUi1 > EUi2, prefers 'no health insur-
ance' if EUi1 < EUi2, and is indifferent between the two
options if EUi1 = EUi2. Thus, the probability that ith house-
hold prefers to have health insurance is: Pi1 = P(EUi1 >
EUi2). And, conversely, the probability that ith household
prefers not to have health insurance is: Pi2 = P(EUi1 <
EUi2).
To determine the probability of health insurance owner-
ship, the following model was estimated:
Pij  = (α  +  β1  HEALTH_RATING + β2
ENVIRONMENT_RATING + β3 RESIDENCE + β4 INCOME
+  β5EDUCATION + β6 AGE + β7 AGE_SQUARED + β8
RACE + β9 HOUSEHOLD_SIZE + β10 OCCUPATION + β11
EMPLOYMENT + β12 SMOKING + β13 ALCOHOL_USE +
β14 CONTRACEPTIVES_USE + β15 MARITAL_STATUS +
εi........................ (2)
where: Pij = 1 if individual 'i' owns insurance (j = 1) and
equals zero otherwise (j = 0); (α) is the intercept term;
(β's) are the estimated coefficients; and εi is the stochastic
error term. The explanatory variables included in the
model are defined in Table 1. Because of the limitations
associated with linear probability model, the logit version
of equation 2 was estimated, using maximum Likelihood
Method.
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